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DECLINE OF THE “LITTLE
PARLIAMENT”: JURIES AND JURY
REFORM IN ENGLAND AND WALES
SALLY LLOYD-BOSTOCK* AND CHERYL THOMAS**
I
INTRODUCTION
The English jury1 evokes passionate and often extreme views.  On the one
hand, trial by jury is vigorously defended as an ancient right,2 a bastion of lib-
erty,3 and a means whereby the ordinary person’s common sense views can in-
form decisions and contain the powers of government.4  On the other hand, the
jury is regarded much more cynically as a costly, sometimes incompetent
anachronism that merely creates opportunities for exploitation by
“professional” criminals at great public expense.5  This century in England, the
second of these views appears to have gained ground.  The scope and powers of
the English jury have markedly declined, and jury trials are increasingly seen as
excessively expensive and time consuming.  Juries have all but disappeared in
civil cases, and their use in criminal cases is continually threatened by sustained
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1. The United Kingdom embraces three separate legal systems (for England and Wales, Scot-
land, and Northern Ireland), each with different jury systems.  This article is concerned with England
and Wales, and for simplicity and following custom, will refer to “England” as including both England
and Wales.
2. The right of a freeman to the “legal judgement of his peers” is mentioned in Clause 39 of
Magna Carta (1215).
3. Lord Devlin writes:
Each jury is a little parliament. . . .  No tyrant could afford to leave a subject’s freedom in the
hands of twelve of his countrymen.  So that trial by jury is more than an instrument of justice
and more than one wheel of the constitution: it is the lamp that shows that freedom lives.
SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 164 (1956).
4. See M.D.A. Freeman, The Jury on Trial, 34 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 65, 88 (1981).  Freeman
writes: “Juries infuse ‘non-legal’ values into the trial process.  They are the conscience of the commu-
nity: they represent current ethical conventions.  They are a constraint on legalism, arbitrariness and
bureaucracy.”  Id. at 90.
5. The strength and range of views held by senior members of the legal profession were demon-
strated by the papers presented at a seminar on December 10, 1997, at Gray’s Inn, London, entitled
The Effectiveness of Juries and the Use of the Civil Courts in the Control of Crime (papers on file with
author).  The seminar was chaired by the Lord Chief Justice Lord Bingham, and organised by the
British Academy of Forensic Sciences and jointly sponsored by the Criminal Bar Association, the Ad-
ministrative Law Bar Association, and the Law Society.
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growth in the number of criminal trials and by growing government interest in
efficiency and crime control.
This article begins with an historical look at the English jury, and then
briefly places the jury and jury reform in the context of the English legal and
political system.  After outlining the limited role remaining for juries in civil
cases, the remainder of the article focuses on juries in criminal cases, discussing
the scope of the right to jury trial, and the rules governing jury trial, such as the
selection of jurors, the conduct of the trial, and verdicts.6  Recent changes or
proposals for change have been made in all these areas.  However, the impetus
for change has come from immediate political concerns, high-profile cases, and
anecdote as much as from systematic information or reliable research.
II
EVOLUTION OF THE ENGLISH JURY
The idea of an “ancient right” to jury trial is an attractive argument, and the
present-day English jury does indeed have roots that can be traced back several
centuries.7  But the jury has continuously adapted and evolved, and its functions
have changed fundamentally over the years.  Besides changes in the jury itself,
wider changes to the criminal justice system have transformed the nature of the
right to a jury trial.  In particular, the growth of legal aid in criminal cases this
century8 means that virtually all criminal defendants are represented by a
trained lawyer, strengthening the defendant’s position whilst placing an in-
creasing burden on the public purse.
The original concept of the jury was probably imported into England after
the Norman Conquest in 1066.  The Normans had developed the practice of
putting a group of local individuals under oath (hence the term “juror”9) to tell
the truth.  Early jurors in England acted as sources of information on local af-
fairs—for instance gathering information for the Domesday Book—but they
gradually came to be used as adjudicators in both civil and criminal disputes.
By 1367, it had become established that a unanimous verdict was required.  Ini-
tially jurors were selected for their prior knowledge of the matter in dispute.  A
judge summoned a group of worthy citizens to decide between rival claims
                                                          
6. The basic features of the jury in England and Wales are outlined in many textbooks.  The out-
line in this paper draws in particular on S.H. BAILEY & M.J. GUNN, SMITH & BAILEY ON THE
MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM (Sweet & Maxwell, 3d ed. 1996), CATHERINE ELLIOTT &
FRANCES QUINN, ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM ch. 5 (2d ed. 1998), and A. SANDERS & R. YOUNG,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1994).
7. There are numerous accounts of the early emergence of the English jury.  This summary draws
in particular on BAILEY & GUNN, supra note 6, at 888-89, ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 6, ch. 5, and
GEOFFREY ROBERTSON QC, FREEDOM, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 348-51 (7th ed. 1993).
8. The legal aid system provides government-funded legal assistance in both criminal and civil
cases.  A number of schemes run by the Bar and judiciary existed in the 19th century to provide free or
cheap legal advice to some prisoners in criminal cases.  However, it was the Poor Prisoners’ Defence
Act, 1903, § 1 (Eng.), that first introduced substantial provision for legal aid from public funds in cases
heard by a judge and jury.  See Tamara Goriely, The Development of Criminal and Legal Aid in Eng-
land and Wales, in ACCESS TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 26 (Richard Young & David Wall eds., 1996).
9. From the Latin jurare, to swear.
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based on their local knowledge.  However, the principle gradually emerged that
jurors should be uninvolved in the case, and by the eighteenth century a juror
with personal knowledge was required to excuse himself from serving on the
jury.  Until the mid-nineteenth century, jury trial was the only form of trial in
the common law courts, and until the early twentieth century, it continued to
predominate for civil as well as criminal cases.
Early jurors often faced physical ordeals in carrying out their duties.  They
could be starved into submission by being locked up without food or heat until
they returned a guilty verdict.  The Star Chamber was known to punish jurors
who refused to convict by seizing their land and possessions.  The 1670 Bushell10
case marked a major turning point in such practices and is still remembered by
an inscribed gold plaque hanging in the Old Bailey.11  Twelve jurymen refused
to convict the Quakers William Penn and William Mead of seditious assembly
and were locked up for two nights without food, water, fire, tobacco, or cham-
ber-pot.12  When this failed to force them to retract their not guilty verdict, the
jurors were sentenced to prison until they had paid a fine.13  Four of the jurors,
led by Bushell, refused to pay the fine and challenged their incarceration by a
writ of habeas corpus.14  The Lord Chief Justice released them in a landmark
decision establishing the jury as the sole judge of fact.15  The jury could give a
verdict according to its conscience, and jurors could not be penalised for taking
a view of the facts which was at odds with the judge.  It is under the principles
established in Bushell that the jury has been acclaimed as “the lamp that shows
that freedom lives”16 and “the bulwark of liberty.”17  The jury has complete
power over the verdict and is not required to give any explanation or justifica-
tion.  A defendant may appeal against conviction, but an appeal cannot be
made simply on the grounds that the jury’s decision is unjustified or mistaken.
The right of a jury to exercise judgment according to conscience continued
to generate controversy over the next three centuries as juries continued to ac-
quit with impunity even though the law and the evidence clearly indicated the
defendant’s guilt.  Juries’ refusals to convict radicals charged with publishing
seditious attacks on King George III and his government are among the best
known exercises of these rights.  In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, juries repeatedly undervalued stolen property in theft cases, evi-
dently because theft of goods valued at more than forty shillings carried the
                                                          
10. Bushell’s Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
11. The Old Bailey is the famous Central Criminal Court in London.
12. See 124 Eng. Rep. at 1007.
13. See id. at 1006
14. See id. at 1012.
15. See id. at 1018.
16. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 164.
17. Ford v. Blurton, 38 T.L.R. 801, 805 (1922) (Lord Atkin describing jury trial as “the bulwark of
liberty, the shield of the poor from the oppression of the rich and powerful”).
LLOYD-BOSTOCK.FMT4.DOC 08/02/99  4:07 PM
10 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 2
death penalty.18  The acquittal of Clive Ponting in 1985 of offences under the
Official Secrets Act stands out as a contemporary example of a jury verdict ac-
cording to conscience and against the weight of the evidence.19  Ponting, a sen-
ior Ministry of Defence official, was charged with violating Section 2 of the Of-
ficial Secrets Act,20 which prohibited government employees from revealing
information obtained in the course of their job without the authorisation of a
superior.21  At his trial, Ponting admitted to passing to a Member of Parliament
classified documents which indicated that government ministers had lied to
Parliament about the sinking of the Argentine warship, the General Belgrano,
during the Falklands War.22  He argued that he owed a greater duty to make the
information public than to observe the Official Secrets Act, and it appears the
jury agreed with him.23  The right of juries to decide in defiance of the law, or
“jury nullification,” is central to the jury’s democratic function and is discussed
further below.  As the current Chairman of the Criminal Bar Association, Roy
Amlot, writes, “Parliament enacts and a powerful Government with a strong
whip may enact harsh laws.  But no jury can be forced to implement what it
considers to be a harsh law.  In this way a jury plays a vital part in the demo-
cratic process.”24
III
LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE ENGLISH JURY
Amlot writes that the spirit of trial by jury “is burnt into the consciousness
of every Englishman—to such an extent that the jury’s detractors might as well
attempt to do away with Parliamentary democracy as trial by jury.”25  While it is
certainly true that any perceived attack on the jury can expect to be met with
vociferous resistance, the constitutional position of the English jury leaves it
more vulnerable than the jury in the United States.  In England, the right to
trial by jury is not enshrined in an entrenched constitution.26  The nature and
                                                          
18. See ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 350-51.  For a history of the role of juries deciding according
to conscience, see T.A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL 1200-1800 (1985).
19. See J.C. Smith & D.J. Birch, Case and Comment—R. v. Ponting, 1985 CRIM. L. REV. 318, 320.
20. A new Official Secrets Act was passed in 1989, and while Section 2 was abolished, the new re-
strictions relating to disclosure of government information are considerable.  See ROBERTSON, supra
note 7, at 167-73.
21. See Smith & Birch, supra note 19, at 320.
22. See id. at 319.
23. See id. at 320.
24. Roy Amlot, Leave the Jury Alone, in The Effectiveness of Juries and the Use of the Civil
Courts in the Control of Crime, supra note 5, at 42.
25. Id.
26. The United Kingdom operates within a unique constitutional system in which constitutional
law is to be found in a combination of statute, common law, conventions, and international treaties
rather than in a single written document.  This reflects a political system based on the overriding prin-
ciple of parliamentary sovereignty, whereby Parliament in principle can make or unmake any law it
chooses.  It follows that Parliament is incapable of binding its successors, since a subsequent Parlia-
ment similarly has the power to undo previous legislation.  For a detailed discussion of the constitu-
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extent of the right to trial by jury are governed by ordinary parliamentary stat-
ute, which can be altered by a simple act of Parliament.  To the extent it con-
trols Parliament, the government of the day could, in principle, radically change
or even abolish the right to jury trial.  However, the political barriers to at-
tacking the jury are considerable, and governments generally tread cautiously.
Changes to the jury system have tended to be piecemeal and incremental rather
than sweeping.
The main statute governing the present day jury is the Juries Act.27  The
same rules generally apply to both civil and criminal juries.  Many other stat-
utes contain important provisions relating to the jury, including the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act28 and the Contempt of Court Act.29  The govern-
ment departments most likely to be concerned with jury reform are the Lord
Chancellor’s Department and the Home Office.30  Several ad hoc Departmental
Committees of Inquiry and Royal Commissions31 have made recommendations
concerning aspects of the jury and will be referred to throughout this article.
These include the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice under the chairman-
ship of Viscount Runciman (“Runciman Commission”), which was set up in re-
sponse to concern over miscarriages of justice and reported in 1993,32 the Fraud
Trials Committee chaired by Lord Roskill (“Roskill Committee”), which re-
ported in 1986,33 the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure, which reported
in 1981,34 the Morris Departmental Committee on Jury Service (“Morris Com-
mittee”), which reported in 1965,35 and the James Committee on the Distribu-
tion of Criminal Business between the Crown Court and the Magistrates Court,
which addressed the right to elect trial by jury and which reported in 1975.36
One of the most controversial statutory provisions regarding juries has been
Section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act, which prevents any research or other
enquiry into jury deliberations.  This section was inserted after the former Lib-
eral Party Leader Jeremy Thorpe was acquitted of conspiracy to murder in a
                                                          
tional structure of the United Kingdom and the role of Parliament, see A.W. BRADLEY & K.D.
EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3-98 (12th ed. 1998).
27. Juries Act, 1974 (Eng.).
28. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, § 31 (Eng.).
29. See Contempt of Court Act, 1981, § 8 (Eng.).
30. The Lord Chancellor (a cabinet minister as well as head of the judiciary and an active legisla-
tive member of the House of Lords) has broad responsibility for the administration of justice, although
responsibility for the penal system lies with the Home Secretary.
31. Royal Commissions, usually well funded, are established to inquire into and recommend
changes in specified areas of the law or governmental or legal institutions.
32. See ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIM. JUST., REPORT, 1993, Cmnd. 2263 [hereinafter RUNCIMAN
COMMISSION].
33. See FRAUD TRIAL COMM., REPORT, 1986 [hereinafter ROSKILL REPORT].
34. See ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIM. PROC., REPORT, 1981, Cmnd. 8092.
35. See DEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON JURY SERVICE, REPORT, 1965, Cmnd. 2627.  Some of its rec-
ommendations were implemented by the Criminal Justice Act, 1972 (Eng.).
36. See INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF CRIM. BUS. BETWEEN THE
CROWN COURT AND MAGISTRATES’ COURTS, REPORT, 1975, Cmnd. 6323 [hereinafter JAMES
COMMITTEE].
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highly publicised jury trial.37  One of the jurors gave an interview to the New
Statesman magazine explaining how the jury had reached its decision.38  The
magazine was prosecuted, but the High Court refused to find that it had com-
mitted contempt of court in publishing the story.39  The government moved
immediately to insert a new clause into the Contempt of Court Act making it a
criminal offence to “obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements
made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced, or votes cast by members of a
jury in the course of their deliberations.”40
There have been increasing calls for a relaxation of this ban for the pur-
poses of academic research.  Although not all jury research requires the ques-
tioning of actual jurors, the Contempt of Court Act has been a major inhibition
to jury research in England.41  In 1986, Roskill expressed frustration at being
unable to question jurors in his investigation of the future of fraud trials.42  Lack
of research on juries also meant that the Runciman Commission felt unable to
make recommendations on whether there is a case for raising the age limit for
jury service or whether there should be literacy or comprehension require-
ments for jurors.43  The Commission recommended that the Contempt of Court
Act be amended “so that informed debate can take place rather than argument
based only on surmise and anecdote.”44  Following the Maxwell fraud case, dis-
cussed below, support for lifting the Contempt of Court Act prohibition on
questioning jurors came from the Bar, the Law Society, senior members of the
judiciary, and the Serious Fraud Office.45  Some commentators have suggested
that the jury would not survive close scrutiny and that secrecy must surround
the jury room if the jury is to be workable.46  But the jury has survived extensive
research in the United States.  As Robertson argues, the ban “has not worked
as its advocates predicted to protect the jury system from attack: on the con-
trary, it has imposed yet another layer of secrecy which handicaps those who
would wish to defend the system with more than anecdotal evidence.”47
                                                          
37. See Attorney General v. New Statesman & Nation Publ’g Co., 1981 Q.B. 1, 5 (Eng. C.A.).
38. See id. at 6.
39. See id.
40. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, § 8 (Eng.).
41. Sarah McCabe, for example, laments the paucity of research on the English jury.  See Sarah
McCabe, Is Jury Research Dead?, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK 27 (Mark Findlay & Peter Duff eds.,
1988).
42. See ROSKILL REPORT, supra note 33, ¶¶ 8.10-.11, app. A ¶ 7.
43. See RUNCIMAN COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 2.
44. Id.
45. See Francis Gibb, The Result of the Maxwell Brothers’ Case Has Put the System Under the
Spotlight, TIMES (London), Jan. 30, 1996, at 31.
46. See, e.g., Ely Devons, Serving as a Juryman in Britain, 28 MOD. L. REV. 561 (1965).
47. ROBERTSON, supra note 7, at 361.
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IV
THE SCOPE OF JURY TRIAL
The role of the English jury today is almost entirely confined to the more
serious criminal cases.  Juries occasionally sit in civil trials, and even less fre-
quently in the Coroner’s Court (as a result of the Coroners Amendment Act,48
which enabled the coroner to sit without a jury in almost all cases).49
A. The Jury in Civil Cases
The frequency of civil jury trials steadily declined in England and Wales
from the middle of the nineteenth century, when judges were given the right to
refuse trial by jury.  Today, less than one percent of civil trials are jury trials.50
The Supreme Court Act51 gives a qualified right to trial by jury in only four
types of civil case: libel and slander, fraud, malicious prosecution, and false im-
prisonment.52  Even in these cases, the right can be denied where the court is of
the opinion that the trial requires “prolonged examination of documents or ac-
counts, or any scientific or local investigation which cannot be conveniently
made with a jury.”53  A large proportion of civil actions in England and Wales
are personal injury cases, where jury trial is no longer a right, although it may
still be granted at the discretion of the court.  Ward v. James, decided in 1965, is
often considered to be the death blow to civil juries in personal injury cases:
The Court of Appeal held that personal injury litigation should be heard by a
single judge unless there were special considerations.54  However, by then it was
already rare for the parties to ask for juries in personal injury cases, most par-
ties preferring the predictability of a judge.55
Currently, civil juries are used most often in defamation cases.  A major
cause for concern has been the usually large size of jury awards in such cases.
In 1975, the Faulks Committee on Defamation recommended that the function
of the jury in defamation cases be limited to deciding issues of liability, leaving
the assessment of damages to the judge.56  The recommendation was not im-
plemented, however, and in 1995 the Court of Appeal in John v. MGN Ltd.57
                                                          
48. See Coroners Amendment Act, 1926, § 13 (Eng.).
49. Coroner’s juries are still usually required where the death occurred in custody or involves the
conduct of the police.
50. See ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 6, at 123.
51. Supreme Court Act, 1981, § 69 (Eng.).
52. See BAILEY & GUNN, supra note 6, at 790; ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 6, at 123.
53. ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 6, at 123-24.
54. See Ward v. James, 1966 Q.B. 273 (Eng. C.A.).
55. In 1990, a personal injury claim related to the underground fire at Kings Cross was refused a
jury trial because, in the court’s view, the case involved technical and far-reaching issues which were
not suitable for a jury.  See ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 6, at 138 (citing Singh v. London Under-
ground).
56. See COMMITTEE ON DEFAMATION, REPORT, 1975, Cmnd. 5909, at 141-43, 180 (known as the
Faulks Committee).
57. 2 All E.R. 35 (1996).
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acted to curb excessive awards through the instructions given to juries.58  In a
libel suit against the Sunday Mirror newspaper, the jury awarded singer Elton
John £350,000 (£75,000 compensatory damages and £275,000 exemplary dam-
ages).  The Court of Appeal set aside the jury’s award and awarded John a total
of £75,000 (£25,000 compensatory and £50,000 exemplary damages).59  In doing
so, the Court of Appeal held that future guidance could be provided for libel
juries in assessing compensatory damages, including reference to appropriate
awards and brackets of awards.60  Reference could also be made to conven-
tional personal injury awards to check the reasonableness of proposed jury
awards.61  Since the Elton John case, the Defamation Act of 1996 has further
curtailed the role of juries in libel cases, establishing a summary procedure
whereby judges, not juries, can dispose of libel claims up to £10,000.62  Judges
now have the power to dismiss weak claims and to make awards of up to
£10,000 for strong claims.63
Following its actions in defamation cases, the Court of Appeal also has re-
cently issued guidelines on the directions to be given to juries assessing dam-
ages in cases of false imprisonment and malicious prosecution brought against
the police.64  These guidelines, which relate in particular to exemplary damages,
came in response to a request from Sir Paul Condon, Metropolitan Police
Commissioner, who claimed that jurors were being influenced by previous
cases in which big sums had been awarded.65  Fifty thousand pounds was held to
be the maximum appropriate award for exemplary damages in such cases; and
exemplary damages were held to be appropriate only when very senior officers
were involved.66  The jury could also be instructed that exemplary damages rep-
resented a windfall to the plaintiff who would have already been awarded com-
pensatory damages, and that, in the case of the Metropolitan Police, the award
was payable out of police funds which consequently would reduce money avail-
able for other purposes.
                                                          
58. See Libel Juries Can Hear Submissions on Amount of Damages, TIMES (London), Jan. 14,
1995, at 42.
59. See 2 All E.R. at 64.
60. See id. at 55.
61. See id. at 56.
62. See Defamation Act, 1996, ch. 31, § 8 (Eng.).
63. See id.
64. See Thompson v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 2 All E.R. 762 (1997)
(consolidated with Hsu v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis).  Thompson sued the police for
false imprisonment, and the case included a claim for damages for personal injury.  Hsu’s case was for
malicious prosecution.
65. See Stewart Tendler, Yard Wants Court to Set Limits on Damages Payouts, TIMES (London),
May 7, 1996, at 3.
66. See Thompson, 2 All E.R. at 776.
LLOYD-BOSTOCK.FMT4.DOC 08/02/99  4:07 PM
Page 7: Spring 1999] ENGLAND AND WALES 15
B. The Jury in Criminal Cases
Even in criminal cases, only one or two percent of all trials are heard by a
jury.67  Instead, the vast majority of criminal cases are tried in the magistrates’
courts by a bench of two or three magistrates.68  A small proportion are tried by
legally trained stipendiary magistrates, but most magistrates have no legal
qualifications and receive no remuneration.  The English criminal justice sys-
tem is probably unique in the extent to which it relies on the services of lay
magistrates (or justices of the peace).69  A jury will try a case only when it goes
to the Crown Court and the defendant pleads not guilty.
Criminal offences are grouped into three classes. “Summary” offences are
the least serious and are triable only in the magistrates’ courts.  Examples of
summary offences include minor traffic offences, avoiding payment of a train
fare, and solicitation.  The most serious offences are classified as “indictable
only” and must be tried in the Crown Court, the lowest tier of the Supreme
Court of England and Wales that exercises criminal jurisdiction.  Between
these extremes are offences classified as “triable either way.”70  Such cases can
be tried either in the magistrates’ courts or the Crown Court, and either the
magistrates or the defendant can opt for trial in the Crown Court.  If the ac-
cused pleads not guilty and the trial proceeds,71 he or she will be tried before a
jury.
Home Office statistics give an indication of the division of criminal business
between the magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court.  An estimated 1,940,000
defendants were proceeded against in the magistrates’ courts in 1995, while the
total for trial in the Crown Court was 86,000.72  Crown prosecution data show
that forty percent of contested trials before a jury resulted in acquittal.73  Fifty-
two percent of cases in the Crown Court are there at the direction of the magis-
trates, and thirty percent are there because the defendant has elected trial in
the Crown Court even though the magistrates are prepared to try the case in
                                                          
67. Estimates vary around one to two percent, depending on exactly how “cases” are counted and
the year taken.  See, e.g., ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 6, at 123.
68. There are 30,374 lay magistrates as well as 90 full-time stipendiaries and 83 acting stipendiar-
ies.  See LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEPARTMENT, JUDICIAL STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT, 1996, Cmnd.
3716, at 90-91.
69. For comparison with a number of continental European countries, see CHERYL THOMAS,
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE (Lord Chancellor’s Department Research Series
No. 6/7, Dec. 1997).
70. Magistrates Court Act, 1980, § 17 (Eng.).
71. The case may be discharged or otherwise disposed of before a jury is sworn into service.
72. See 1 GOVERNMENT STATISTICAL SERVICE, HOME OFFICE STATISTICAL BULLETIN ISSUE
16/96 supp. tbl. (1996).  This report shows that in 1995 in the magistrates’ courts approximately 464,000
defendants were proceeded against for indictable offences, 617,000 defendants were proceeded against
for summary nonmotoring offences, and 858,000 defendants were proceeded against for summary mo-
toring offences.
73. See id. at 4.
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the magistrates’ court.74  The remaining eighteen percent are “indictable only”
and therefore can be tried only in the Crown Court.75
Research suggests that defendants opt for jury trial primarily because both
they and their solicitors believe that chances of acquittal are higher and that
magistrates favour the police.76  Some evidence exists to support this belief.
Julie Vennard, for example, found that in a sample of offences triable either
way, the chances of acquittal were significantly higher in the Crown Court than
in the magistrates’ court.77  However, the allocation of either way offences to
the Crown Court or magistrates’ court is obviously not random, so comparisons
in rates of acquittal in the two courts may not be comparing like-with-like.
Whether the chances of conviction are higher, the magistrates’ courts are un-
deniably quicker and cheaper.  It has been estimated that while a contested
case in a magistrates’ court costs around £1,500 and an uncontested case costs
around £500, the equivalent figures for the Crown Court are £13,500 and
£2,500.78
A substantial proportion of potential jury trials become what are known as
“cracked trials,” where preparations are made for a jury trial that does not take
place because the defendant eventually pleads guilty.79  According to Hedder-
man and Moxon’s research, seventy percent of those who elected trial in the
Crown Court had pleaded guilty to all charges by the day of the trial.80  They
were not therefore tried before a jury and had foregone any perceived increase
in likelihood of acquittal.  Considerable concern has been expressed over the
expense to the public purse that cracked trials represent, and their frequency
has fuelled arguments for limiting or abolishing the ability of defendants to
elect for jury trial.
Adjustments to the borderlines between the different categories of criminal
offences have produced progressive erosion of the right to jury trial over the
past twenty years, and the trend seems likely to continue.  The Criminal Law
Act of 1977 removed the defendant’s right to choose a jury trial in cases of
criminal damage below £200.81  The Criminal Justice Act of 1988 further ex-
tended the powers of magistrates’ courts by expanding summary offences to in-
clude, for example, taking and driving away a car without the owner’s consent
and common assault and battery.82  Pressure continues to further limit the right
                                                          
74. See RUNCIMAN COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 85.
75. See id.
76. See C. HEDDERMAN & D. MOXON, MAGISTRATES COURT OR CROWN COURT? MODE OF
TRIAL DECISIONS AND SENTENCING (1992).
77. See Julie Vennard, The Outcome of Contested Trials, in MANAGING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 126,
129-31 (David Moxon ed., 1985).
78. See ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 6, at 137.
79. See, e.g., REVIEW OF DELAY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, REPORT, 1997 [hereinafter
NAREY REPORT]; M. ZANDER & P. HENDERSON, CROWN COURT STUDY, RESEARCH STUDY NO. 19
FOR THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1993).
80. See HEDDERMAN & MOXON, supra note 76.
81. See Criminal Law Act, 1977, § 22, sched. 4 (Eng.).
82. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, §§ 37-39 (Eng.).
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to jury trial.  In July 1998, the government published a consultation document,
including proposals to remove the right to jury trial for additional offences,
such as some categories of theft.83
There are also continuing moves to remove the right of a defendant to elect
jury trial in either way offences.  In 1993, the Runciman Commission recom-
mended that once the magistrates have decided that the case is suitable for a
summary hearing in the magistrates’ court, the defendant should no longer be
able to insist on trial in the Crown Court.84  The Commission pointed out that
defendants insist on a Crown Court hearing contrary to the views of the magis-
trates in more than 35,000 cases each year, and anticipated that the proposed
change would result in fewer cases being sent to the Crown Court for trial.85  A
1997 Home Office report by Narey agreed that defendants should no longer be
able to veto the decision of magistrates to retain jurisdiction of cases.86  The
government revived discussion of these proposals in July 1998.87
The main justification put forward for limiting the right to jury trial is that
jury trials are expensive and time consuming.  The language of the debate is re-
vealing. Proponents of limiting jury trials dismiss arguments in terms of
“rights” and “justice” and focus rather on “abuse” of the justice system.  For
example,
these recommendations would . . . stop improper manipulation of the justice system.
Magistrates would be well able to distinguish those defendants who . . . were justified
in seeking a Crown Court hearing. . . .  One senior and distinguished magistrate suc-
cinctly summarised the current scope for abuse: . . .  Inevitably, the ones who elect are
experienced defendants, the ones who know how to play the system.88
Narey recounts the 1975 James Committee’s89 hesitation to remove the right
of election from the defendant, recognising that it was necessary to take into
account the substantial body of opinion opposed to such a step.90  But he points
out that few jurisdictions regard it as necessary or even desirable to allow the
defendant any choice as to the court in which he or she will be tried.91  Narey
also suggests that the right to insist on a jury trial is not as ancient as is some-
times thought because there was no right to claim jury trial until 1855.92  How-
ever, this glosses over the difference between the right to a jury trial and the
right to elect for a jury trial.  As Narey himself points out, until that date felo-
nies were always tried on indictment in the Crown Court, as distinct from mis-
                                                          
83. See HOME OFFICE, DETERMINING MODE OF TRIAL IN EITHER WAY CASES (1998).
84. This is already the position in Scotland.  See Peter Duff, The Scottish Criminal Jury: A Very
Peculiar Institution, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 177-78 (Spring 1999).
85. See RUNCIMAN COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 87.
86. See NAREY REPORT, supra note 79, at 35.
87. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 83.
88. NAREY REPORT, supra note 79, at 35.
89. See JAMES COMMITTEE, supra note 36.
90. See NAREY REPORT, supra note 79, at 31-32.
91. See id. at 32.
92. See id. at 31.
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demeanours which were tried summarily in the magistrates’ court.93  Defendant
election became relevant only when it became possible for an increasing range
of indictable offences to be tried summarily with the defendant’s consent.  The
proposed change would, in effect, remove the defendant’s opportunity to refuse
to consent to being tried summarily, and would greatly increase the level of
sentence to which a defendant would be exposed without the chance to elect
for jury trial.
At the time the Narey report appeared in 1997, the Conservative Party was
still in power in Britain.  In opposition, the Labour Party said it would not sup-
port this proposed change.  However, the Labour government has since begun
to consult further on the proposal.94
C. Juries in Fraud Cases
Juries’ competence to try complex cases, especially complex fraud prosecu-
tions, has been questioned repeatedly, and was the subject of inquiry by the
Fraud Trials Committee chaired by Lord Roskill.95  Research conducted for the
Roskill Committee by psychologists at Cambridge University showed that juror
comprehension of complex information could be significantly improved by pro-
viding aides such as glossaries and written summaries and by using visual aids
to present the information.  Nonetheless, the Roskill Committee recommended
that complex fraud trials should no longer be tried by juries,96 but by a fraud
trials tribunal comprised of one judge and two lay experts.97  The recommenda-
tion was not implemented, but is still widely discussed.
Debate over the role of juries in serious fraud cases intensified following
the 1996 Maxwell case in which a jury acquitted the Maxwell brothers of con-
spiracy to defraud a company pension scheme.98  The acquittals followed an ex-
tremely expensive investigation and a lengthy, high-profile trial, and the out-
come was highly embarrassing to the Serious Fraud Office,99 which called for
the abolition of jury trials in serious fraud cases.  The Bar has staunchly op-
                                                          
93. See id.
94. See HOME OFFICE, supra note 83.
95. See ROSKILL REPORT, supra note 33, at 5.
96. See id. at annex (MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY UNIT, CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY, IMPROVING THE PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION TO JURIES IN FRAUD TRIALS: A
REPORT OF FOUR RESEARCH STUDIES).
97. See id. at 147.
98. Kevin and Ian Maxwell are the sons of the flamboyant entrepreneur Robert Maxwell, whose
death precipitated an investigation into his business affairs and uncovered extensive illegal activity in-
cluding misuse of pension funds.  It was argued that the Maxwell brothers were implicated, but they
were acquitted in January 1996.  See Francis Gibb, Not-guilty Verdicts Put System Back in the Dock,
TIMES (London), Jan. 20, 1996, at 3; Gibb, supra note 45, at 31.
99. The Serious Fraud Office was set up by the Criminal Justice Act of 1987 following the Roskill
Committee’s report in 1986.  It institutes and conducts prosecutions in a comparatively small number
of the most serious fraud cases which it investigates and prepares.  The prosecution of other fraud
cases continues to be handled by the Fraud Investigation group within the Crown Prosecution Service.
See Robert Rice, Case Against the Jury: Lord Roskill Tells Robert Rice That Fraud Trials Need Re-
thinking, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Feb. 12. 1992, at 17.
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posed such a move.100  Taking a more moderate position, the Commissioner of
the City of London Police called for more research and a review of the role of
juries in complex fraud cases.101  One idea favoured by some prosecutors is the
introduction of a new straightforward offence of fraud, which would make cases
easier to present to juries.102  Others favour the Hong Kong system of small
fraud juries consisting of six or seven jurors, each of whom must reach a certain
educational standard.103
The Maxwell case has not so far led to extensive reform.  However, the
management of the case by Justice Phillips was innovative in several respects,
and highlighted procedures already within the powers of the judge that could
enable juries to deal more easily with complex cases, some of which reflected
the findings of the Cambridge research for the Roskill Committee.  Justice
Phillips began by reducing the number of charges from ten to two, considering
this to be more manageable for the jurors in a single trial.104  He also reduced
the length of the court day to 9:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. and reserved the afternoons
for legal argument.105  This not only meant that jurors had to concentrate for a
shorter day, but also that counsel discussed legal points in the jury’s absence
without the need for the jury to keep leaving and returning to the courtroom.106
The judge also made extensive use of the court computer system.107  Prosecut-
ing counsel produced a “road map” of documents that would be called and
highlighted specific passages to be examined.108  Several monitors in the court-
room then all displayed the highlighted passages.109  Finally, before the jury re-
tired to consider its verdict, the judge provided the jurors with a written sum-
mary of his three-and-a-half-day summing up, although his refusal to allow
jurors to have daily transcripts was controversial.110
More than a decade after the Roskill Committee reported, debate over the
use of juries in fraud trials is still very much alive.  There are indications that
the current Labour Government is considering the case for abolishing juries in
fraud trials, and the Home Office has produced a consultation document set-
ting out various options.111  At the time of writing, however, there has yet to be
a firm statement on the issue.  The Serious Fraud Office has had greater success
                                                          
100. See Gibb, supra note 98.
101. See Police Urge Jury Review, TIMES (London), Oct. 17, 1996, at 28.
102. See Robert Rice, Jury role in fraud trials to be probed, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Sept. 21,
1996, at O6.
103. See id.







111. See Home Office, Home Office Internet Service, Juries in Serious Fraud Trials: A Consultation
Document (last modified Feb. 1998) <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/jsft.htm>.
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in obtaining convictions since the Maxwell case, which may reduce the pressure
to abolish juries in fraud cases.
V
SELECTION FOR JURY SERVICE
The qualifications and prohibitions determining who can serve on a jury
have undergone some significant changes in the last few decades.  The number
of jurors has remained twelve,112 but the age limit has been lowered to eighteen
years113 and eligibility has been extended to include anyone on the electoral
register not excluded for some specific reason.114  To qualify for jury service, a
person must be between eighteen and seventy years of age and must have been
a resident in the United Kingdom for at least five years since reaching the age
of thirteen.115  Persons who have been sentenced in the United Kingdom to
more than five years’ imprisonment are disqualified from serving, as are per-
sons who have served any part of certain sentences in the past ten years, have
been placed on probation in the last five years, or are currently on bail in
criminal proceedings.116
Several categories of persons are ineligible rather than disqualified.  These
include judges and those concerned with the administration of justice
(including barristers, solicitors, police officers, prison officers, and court staff),
the clergy, and mentally disordered persons.117  In addition, members of several
professions currently have the legal right to refuse to serve, including Members
of Parliament, peers, doctors, dentists, nurses, veterinary surgeons, chemists,
and anyone in the armed forces.  With the aim of reducing requests to be ex-
cused, the Criminal Justice Act of 1988 introduced the possibility of deferring
jury service and requiring those who have specific commitments to serve at a
later date.118
Potential jurors are randomly selected from the electoral register.  Before
1972, jurors were drawn only from those who owned property of a prescribed
rateable value, which ensured that juries were “predominantly male, mid-
                                                          
112. The historical reasons for using this number are unknown, although it has been pointed out
that this is “the same number as the Apostles of Christ and the ancient tribes of Israel.”  S.H. BAILEY
& M.J. GUNN, SMITH & BAILEY ON THE MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 798 n.38 (Sweet & Max-
well, 2d ed. 1991).
113. See Juries Act, 1974, § 1 (Eng.).
114. See id. § 3.
115. See id. § 1.  The upper age limit was raised to 70 by the Criminal Justice Act, 1998, § 119
(Eng.).
116. See Juries Act, 1974, § 1 (Eng.) (as amended by the Juries Disqualification Act, 1984, § 1
(Eng.)).  The last category, those on bail, was added by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act,
1994, § 40 (Eng.).
117. See id. sched. 1 (Eng.) (as amended by the Mental Health Amendment Act, 1982, sched. 3
(Eng.) and the Mental Health Act, 1983, sched. 4 (Eng.)).
118. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, § 20 (Eng.) (amending Juries Act, 1974, § 9 (Eng.)).
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dle-aged, middle-minded and middle class.”119  Research has shown that there
have been profound changes in the composition of juries since 1972.  They have
become much younger and less middle class.120  However, there still appears to
be an under-representation of women and ethnic minorities.
The extension of the jury franchise in 1972 followed the recommendation of
the Morris Committee in 1965.121  In contrast to other changes in the rules re-
lating to juries over the past twenty-five years, this change appears to have
been dictated by “due process” rather than “crime control” values.122  The
“elite” nature of the composition of the jury had come to be seen as a threat
both to its legitimacy in a democratic society and to claims that it introduced
common sense to the system and protected the ordinary citizen from the state.
However, Nicholas Blake, writing for the National Council for Civil Liberties,
suggests that the results of the changes in juror qualification were not to every-
one’s liking.123  According to Blake, police, judges, and some lawyers com-
plained of a deterioration in the standard of jurors, who were now too stupid,
too irresponsible, too easily bribed or intimidated, or too much of a security
risk.124
Random selection of jurors from the electoral register has been done by
computer since 1981.  The people selected receive a summons requiring them
to attend at the Crown Court at a specified time.  Those summoned constitute
the panel from which the jury for an individual case will be selected if a plea of
not guilty is entered.  Twelve people are selected from the jury panel by ballot,
which is conducted in open court, and after an opportunity for challenges, as
discussed below, the jury is sworn and the trial can begin.  Random selection by
computer is the practice rather than the required procedure.  This is illustrated
in the 1996 Salt case.125  A Crown Court usher called on his son to sit as a mem-
ber of the jury when the number of jurors available was insufficient.126  After a
summons was issued and a ballot card created, the son became one of the
twelve jurors.127  When the defendant appealed the conviction on the ground of
improper empanelling of the jury, the court held that every practicable effort
should be made to ensure random jury selection, but that there is no rule of law
                                                          
119. DEVLIN, supra note 3, at 20.  Bailey & Gunn cite the instance of a case in Derby in 1932, in
which Bernard Rothman and others were tried on charges relating to mass trespass on private land in
the Peak District.  The jury was reported to consist of two brigadier-generals, three colonels, two ma-
jors, three captains, and two aldermen.  See BAILEY & GUNN, supra note 6, at 891 n.15.
120. The research findings are summarised by id. at 891-93.  Sources include JOHN BALDWIN &
MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS (1979), and ZANDER & HENDERSON, supra note 79.
121. See DEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON JURY SERVICE, supra note 35.
122. For discussion of this point, see Peter Duff & Mark Findlay, The Politics of Jury Reform, in
THE JURY UNDER ATTACK, supra note 41, at 209.
123. See NICHOLAS BLAKE, The Case for the Jury, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK, supra note 41, at
140, 142.
124. See id. at 142-43.
125. See Son of Crown Court Usher Acted Regularly as a Juror, TIMES (London), Feb. 1, 1996, at 38.
126. See id.
127. See id.
LLOYD-BOSTOCK.FMT4.DOC 08/02/99  4:07 PM
22 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 62: No. 2
requiring it.128  Indeed, it appears that an officer of the court can require an eli-
gible member of the public to come in off the street to serve on a jury if there
are insufficient numbers.129  However, in Salt it transpired that the son had sat
on five or six Crown Court juries during the previous year.130  The court found
that, due to the frequency of his jury service, he had become in danger of being
regarded as an establishment person, and that he fell within the spirit of the
disqualification that made officers and staff of the court ineligible.131
Jury service, especially on long trials, can pose financial and domestic diffi-
culties for individuals. The basic subsistence allowance for jurors does not
compensate for most persons’ loss of earnings, and many of those summoned
ask for either exemption or deferral.  While in opposition, the Labour Party
announced its intention, if elected, to act to stop people from avoiding jury
service by citing business commitments, holidays, or minor illness.132  It also
proposed to revise the list of professionals who have the legal right to be ex-
cused, but to date no such changes have been made.133  Fears had been ex-
pressed that juries had become “‘skewed’ toward the working class and unem-
ployed who are often unsympathetic to police and more likely to acquit
criminals.”134  However, according to the Runciman Commission’s research,
“the occupations of jurors matched the general population ‘with a slight
over-representation of clerical workers and under-representation of skilled
manual workers.’”135
If a trial is expected to last more than ten days, prospective jurors will be
asked at court if this would be difficult for them.136  The jury-summoning officer
can use his or her discretion to excuse individuals or grant a deferral, usually on
the basis of work, childcare commitments, or booked holidays.  However, a
genuine reason is needed, and people will not generally be excused on account
of job demands, even if they are self-employed.137
In the Maxwell case, for example, in addition to being screened for literacy
and possible prejudice arising from publicity in the media, potential jurors were
asked about their ability to stay the course of a trial lasting several months.138
Jury selection took two weeks and reduced 700 potential jurors to seventy by
                                                          
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., PC pounds Beat in Search of Jury, TIMES (London), Mar. 2, 1999, at 3.
130. See Son of Crown Court Usher Acted Regularly as a Juror, supra note 125, at 38.
131. See id.  The disqualification making officers and staff of the court ineligible is found in Juries
Act, 1974, § 1 (Eng.).
132. See Jill Sherman, Labour Warns Jury Dodgers, TIMES (London), Feb. 7, 1996, at 1.
133. See id.
134. Id.
135. Juries Not Guilty, TIMES (London), Feb. 13, 1996, at 31 (quoting ZANDER & HENDERSON, su-
pra note 79, at 239).
136. A first-hand account of the process from the perspective of an Old Bailey juror is given by
Trevor Grove.  See TREVOR GROVE, THE JURYMAN’S TALE (1998).
137. See Hedley Goldberg, A Random Choice of Jury?, TIMES (London), June 13, 1995, at 41.
138. See Gibb, supra note 98, at 3.
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using lengthy questionnaires and oral questioning.139  Potential jurors were
asked questions regarding their jobs, what papers they read, what they had read
about the Maxwells, whether they had heard about the accusations against the
Maxwells, and whether they would be able to be dispassionate.140  The initial
questionnaires excluded 550 potential jurors for a variety of reasons, such as
poor health or previously booked holidays.141  The replies of the remaining 150
potential jurors were screened by the judge as well as the lawyers for both par-
ties and a quarter of them were excluded “on grounds of literacy and ‘in the in-
terests of justice.’”142  Nearly three-quarters of the potential jurors had given
answers that were incomplete, ambiguous, or otherwise inconsistent, and were
further questioned by the judge in the presence of both sets of lawyers in order
to create a final “shortlist” from which twelve jurors could be chosen at ran-
dom.143
After a trial has begun, the judge has power to discharge jurors for a range
of irregularities, including frivolous behaviour, drunkenness, acquisition of in-
formation that the juror should not have, or discovery of bias that becomes ap-
parent too late to be dealt with at the time for challenge.144  The judge may also
discharge jurors if they become ill or are incapable of continuing to act.145  In
July 1998, for example, the judge removed a juror after he asked the judge for
the defendant’s birth date in order to draw up a star-chart.146  The remaining
eleven jurors continued and in due course acquitted the defendant.147  England
has no system of alternate jurors attending the trial and ready to take the place
of discharged jurors, but the trial can continue as long as the jury does not fall
below nine in number.148
VI
JURY CHALLENGES
In England the scope for jury challenges during the selection procedure is
considerably more restricted than the sometimes lengthy voir dire found in the
United States.  The opportunity for the defence to influence the composition of
the jury was all but eliminated in 1988 when the defence’s long-standing right of






144. There are complex rules governing the powers of the court in respect of juries and how the
judge should handle various situations that may arise.  These are set out in some detail in JOHN
FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE & PRACTICE §§ 4-253 to 4-263 (P.J. Rich-
ardson ed., 1998).
145. See id.
146. See Paul Wilkinson, Juror Wanted to Find Truth in the Stars, TIMES (London), July 9, 1998, at
3.
147. See id.
148. See Juries Act, 1974, § 16 (Eng.).
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peremptory challenge was completely abolished.149  In contrast, the prosecu-
tion’s right to stand jurors by is unchanged.  The right of either side to chal-
lenge for cause remains, but it is of limited use in practice.
Before 1988, the opportunity to challenge peremptorily occurred after the
clerk had asked twelve members of the jury panel to step into the jury box.  De-
fence counsel, or the accused if unrepresented, would call out “challenge” im-
mediately before the juror in question took the oath.  No reason needed to be
given for the challenge and the juror was replaced by another.  The right of the
defence to challenge jurors had been steadily eroded over time.  In 1925, the
number of challenges was reduced from twenty-five to twelve; in 1949, the
number was further reduced to seven (or seven per defendant where several
were tried together); in 1977, the number was fixed at three; and in 1988, the
Criminal Justice Act removed the right altogether.
These progressive reductions appear to have been precipitated by concerns
arising in particular cases.  The 1977 restriction followed a case in which a
number of youths, mainly black, were tried for causing criminal damage and
disorder.150  The defence used their peremptory challenges to try to achieve a
representation of ethnic minorities on the jury, and the youths were acquit-
ted.151  Prior to the most recent change, concern arose when multiple defen-
dants pooled their challenges in single trials, and one trial in particular, the
“Cyprus Secrets” case,152 fuelled the campaign for the abolition of peremptory
challenges.  When eight men in the Royal Air Force were charged with of-
fences under the Official Secrets Act,153 it was claimed that their counsel had
privately agreed to exercise their peremptory challenges to ensure a young
male jury.154  The defendants were all acquitted,155 but it is questionable whether
this was because of the composition of the jury.  There were other reasons why
a jury might be sympathetic.  In fact, systematic data on the peremptory chal-
lenge were available at the time:  A study of 2,500 cases showed that the use of
peremptory challenges was not associated with an increased likelihood of ac-
quittal.156
The right of the defence to a number of peremptory challenges was clearly
intended to provide an opportunity for the defendant to attempt to achieve a
more sympathetic jury, and predates the principle that a jury should be selected
                                                          
149. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, § 118 (Eng.).  The right dated back to the 15th century when it
was introduced to redress the balance to the defendant’s favour.
150. See BLAKE, supra note 123, at 147.
151. See id.
152. The use of the peremptory challenge in the case was discussed in Parliament whilst the 1986
Criminal Justice Bill was on its way through Parliament.  See 113 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) 991-92
(1987).  For further details, see MICHAEL ZANDER, A MATTER OF JUSTICE: THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN
FERMENT 217-19 (1988).
153. See BLAKE, supra note 123, at 147.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See Julie Vennard & David Riley, The Use of Peremptory Challenge and Stand By of Jurors
and Their Relationship to Trial Outcome, 1988 CRIM. L. REV. 731.
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at random.  However, it was discussed by its opponents as if it represented an
erosion of the principle of random selection, and its use were an attempt to “rig
juries.”  For example, the report of the Fraud Trials Committee under Lord
Roskill states that “[t]he existence of the peremptory right of challenge must
necessarily . . . tend to erode the principle of random selection, and may even
enable defendants to ensure that a sufficiently large part of a jury is rigged in
their favour.”157
One serious consequence of the abolition of the peremptory challenge is the
loss of a potential means to ensure a racially mixed jury.  Even a jury represen-
tative of the adult population may contain few or no jurors of the same race as
the defendant.  In 1989, the Court of Appeal in R. v. Ford held that there is no
principle that a jury should be racially balanced, that race should not be taken
into account in selecting jurors, and that the trial judge had no power to inter-
fere with the composition of the jury to achieve a multiracial jury.158  Doing so
would interfere with both the random selection of jurors and the responsibility
of the Lord Chancellor’s Department to summon jurors.159  According to the
court, such a power would have to be granted by statute.160  Agreeing with this
position in most cases, the Runciman Commission put forward a limited pro-
posal for ensuring that a jury includes at least three members from the same
ethnic group as the defendant in exceptional cases.  They suggested that such a
case might be one in which “black people are accused of violence against a
member of an extremist organisation who they said had been making racial
taunts against them and their friends.”161  The Commission for Racial Equality
has also pressed for special procedures in cases with a racial dimension and
where a defendant from an ethnic minority believes an all white jury is unlikely
to give him or her a fair trial.162  As Bailey and Gunn state, “[s]imply relying
upon random selection, and failing to address real concerns about jury compo-
sition is not likely to satisfy the deep concerns held about the criminal justice
system by many people from an ethnic minority.”163
Even though the right to challenge “for cause” remains, it is normally an
empty right for the defence, since the challenging party must adduce prima fa-
cie evidence to support the challenge before the juror may be questioned about
his or her suitability.164  The defence has practically no information on which to
base such a challenge and no right to ask potential members of the jury ex-
ploratory questions about their backgrounds or attitudes with a view to show-
                                                          
157. ROSKILL REPORT, supra note 33, at 126.
158. See R. v. Ford, 3 All E.R. 445 (Eng. C.A. 1989).  The defendant was charged with six offences
relating to unlawful use of a motor car.  His counsel applied to the judge for a multiracial jury, but the
application was refused.  The defendant was convicted and appealed.
159. See id. at 447.
160. See id.
161. RUNCIMAN COMMISSION, supra note 32, at 133-34.
162. See id. at 133.
163. BAILEY & GUNN, supra note 6, at 893.
164. See ELLIOTT & QUINN, supra note 6, at 128.
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ing that they should not be on the jury.  Not surprisingly, challenges for cause
are generally believed to be rare, though statistics are not available.
The right to ask questions of prospective jurors was severely restricted after
the so-called Angry Brigade Trial in 1972, which involved charges arising from,
amongst other things, bombings of the houses of Members of Parliament.165
The trial judge agreed to ask jurors to exclude themselves on a number of
grounds, including if they had relatives serving in Northern Ireland or in the
police force, or if they were members of the Conservative Party.  Thirty-nine
jurors were removed after questioning.166  Shortly after the case, the Lord Chief
Justice issued a Practice Note designed to stop such questions.167  In 1973, the
Lord Chancellor decided that juror occupations would no longer be available
because of evidence of “abuse” by defence counsel, who were using the infor-
mation when exercising peremptory challenges in cases with political over-
tones.168
The Roskill Committee was particularly critical of the use of the peremp-
tory challenge with reference only to superficial appearance such as dress or
the carrying of a particular newspaper.169  Yet it was not in favour of providing
the defence with fuller information.  The Committee conceded that if the per-
emptory challenge were abolished there would be a case for returning to the
practice of including jurors’ occupations, but did not think “that any further
disclosure of information about prospective jurors need be made available to
the defence as of right.”170  The Committee repeated concerns that abolishing
the right of peremptory challenge might lead to increased use of the challenge
for cause, which in turn might lead to “the kind of protracted proceedings
which sometimes take place in the United States—the so-called voir dire.”171  It
appears that for Roskill it is an abuse to challenge, whether on the basis of su-
perficial information or on the basis of fuller and “relevant” information.
In some circumstances, not even the names of jurors will be known.  Under
the standard procedure, the clerk of the court invites members of the jury pool
to answer when the names of those selected by ballot are called, before ex-
plaining that any challenges are to be made after this process.  However, in a
recent case, the Court of Appeal held that jurors’ names could be withheld if it
                                                          
165. See ZANDER, supra note 152, at 223.
166. See id.
167. See N.P. Metcalfe, Esq. Barrister, Practice Note, 1 All E.R. 240, 240 (1973) (stating that it was
“contrary to established practice for jurors to be excluded on . . . general grounds such as race, religion
or political beliefs or occupation”).
168. See Practice Direction, 57 Crim. App. 345 (Eng. 1973).
169. See ROSKILL REPORT, supra note 33, at 129.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 128-29.  Lord Roskill was confident that
no such practice would ever be entertained by the judiciary in this country . . . .  [W]e would
expect judges to continue to be firm and adhere to well-established principles in carrying out
their statutory duty of determining the propriety of a challenge for cause and of following the
well established practice of not permitting such a challenge . . . without the prima facie evi-
dence referred to above.
Id.
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was thought necessary to prevent a jury being “nobbled,”172 provided that the
defendant’s right of challenge was preserved.173  In this drug-related case, after
the first jury had been discharged, a second group of jurors was called to the
jury box only by numbers allocated to them by the court clerk, sworn in, and
given police protection.174
VII
STAND-BY FOR THE PROSECUTION AND JURY VETTING
The now-defunct defence right of peremptory challenge is paralleled by the
prosecution right to stand a juror by.  This technique was developed when the
Crown’s right to challenge peremptorily was abolished in 1307 due to concern
about prosecutors stacking juries.175  The effect of standing a juror by is to re-
move him or her without showing cause.176  There is no limit on the number of
jurors who may be stood by.177  The juror goes back into the pool and may in
theory be called again if the pool runs out.178  The prosecution can thus defer
having to show cause until the pool is exhausted.  It was widely expected that
the prosecution’s right to stand by would be removed with the peremptory
challenge, but that has not happened.  The government argued that the right
was being used sparingly in practice and that in the absence of evidence of im-
proper use there was no need to abolish it.179
In addition, the prosecution may have access to information on jurors ob-
tained by the police, CID, or Special Branch180 for purposes of jury vetting.  It is
up to the Director of Public Prosecutions to authorise vetting.  In 1978, re-
sponding to public pressure, the Attorney General revealed the guidelines,
which provide for juror investigation in cases where strong political motives are
involved.181  If anything indicating “disloyalty” is found, the juror is to be stood
by.182  Use of the stand-by procedure means that no reason is given publicly.
The clandestine way in which jury vetting is conducted causes great concern,
and the process has been condemned by the National Council for Civil Lib-
erty.183
                                                          
172. That is, interfered with in some way, such as by bribery or intimidation.  The term comes from
horseracing and the “nobbling” of horses to prevent them from winning.
173. See R. v. Comerford, 1 W.L.R. 191, 195 (Eng. C.A. 1998).  The Court of Appeal held that
§i12(3) of the Juries Act of 1974 did not contain a mandatory requirement that names be called, as the
purpose of that provision was to define the time at which a challenge was to be made.
174. See id. at 194.





180. The CID and Special Branch are both divisions within the British Police.
181. See ELLIOT & QUINN, supra note 6, at 126-27.
182. See BLAKE, supra note 123, at 148.
183. See id. at 159.
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VIII
THE EXPERIENCE OF BEING A JUROR
Discussion of juries in England has tended to neglect the perspective of the
juror, but there has recently been an increase of interest in the experience of
being a juror amongst both the general public and the legal profession.  The
central concern has been the lasting impact jury service may have on the more
than 250,000 jurors called each year.  The emotional and psychological impact
of serving on juries for murder cases was explored in a BBC television docu-
mentary broadcast in 1997.  Jurors who had served on murder cases spoke of
long-term psychological problems resulting from the experience.184  Stressful
experiences included exposure to horrific evidence and in some cases, intimida-
tion.  Some had lingering doubts about the wisdom of the final outcome.
The government has begun to recognise that jury service can have long-
term effects.  The Lord Chancellor’s Department offered counselling to the ju-
rors at the close of the 1995 Rosemary West murder trial to deal with the dis-
tress of exposure to particularly horrific and graphic details of the murders of a
number of young women.185  Jurors were given use of a free telephone help-line
and the opportunity to consult family doctors or come together for a group ses-
sion with the Department’s own welfare officers.186  Since the West case, court-
appointed welfare officers have been made available to speak to jurors at their
own request or in cases deemed exceptional by judges.
It is also claimed that jury trials are time consuming and in some cases bor-
ing for jurors.187  In a fascinating and generally positive inside account of his
own experience of serving on a jury in a long running case at the Old Bailey,
journalist Trevor Grove illustrates many jurors’ concerns, such as the emo-
tional impact of distressing evidence, the strain of giving the verdict, the tedium
of frequent delays and periods of inactivity, and the sense of exclusion that
comes from being repeatedly sent out of the courtroom so that matters can be
discussed in the jury’s absence.188
IX
JURIES AND PRETRIAL PUBLICITY
Whereas the protected freedom of the press requires courts in the United
States to tolerate a high degree of publicity before and during jury trials, the
English approach restrains the press to protect the defendant from the possible
effects of publicity on jury decisionmaking.  The press may even be prevented
from reporting court proceedings after the trial is over for fear of prejudicing a
                                                          
184. See Modern Times (BBC 2 television broadcast, Apr. 16, 1997).
185. See David Conn, Counselling for Counsel, TIMES (London), Jan. 2, 1996, at 29.
186. See id.
187. “It has been said that the most interesting thing that can happen to a juror during a trial is be-
ing allowed to sit in a different chair.”  Goldberg, supra note 137, at 41.
188. See GROVE, supra note 136, at 41-42.
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future trial.  Prejudicial publicity is dealt with in two main ways.  Under the
provisions of the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, the media are quite fre-
quently barred from, and occasionally prosecuted for, publishing prejudicial
material before or during a trial.189  In addition, abuse of process jurisdiction
empowers the court to stay criminal proceedings on the ground that a fair trial
has become impossible.190  As previously described, the Contempt of Court Act
also prohibits revealing anything about jury deliberations.191  Vidmar argues
that use of the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act (including prohibitions
on talking to jurors), together with the growing use of the power to stay pro-
ceedings, place England at the opposite end of a continuum from the United
States.192
Where prosecutions under the Contempt of Court Act are concerned,
Corker and Levi argue that there is a lacuna in the law which severely limits the
ability of the Attorney General to regulate and deter press coverage.193  For a
prosecution to succeed, it must be shown that a particular article or broadcast
has created a substantial risk of prejudice.  However, in practice, the effect is
often cumulative, involving a number of editors, newspaper articles, or broad-
casts over a period of time.194  Corker and Levi argue that this weakness in the
law forces responsibility for dealing with prejudicial publicity onto the trial
judge, who can influence coverage only after the trial has started.195
Until recently, stays of proceedings on the grounds of pretrial publicity
were rare, and jurors were treated as capable of following the judge’s instruc-
tions to avoid prejudice.196  However, Corker and Levi identify a marked
change in recent years as courts increasingly recognise that publicity can cause
substantial prejudice and have demonstrated a corresponding willingness to in-
tervene.197  In several cases in the 1990s, proceedings have been halted and con-
victions have been overturned in part on the basis that pretrial publicity made
or would make a fair trial impossible.198  In R. v. McCann, the Court of Appeal
overturned the conviction of alleged Irish terrorists because the trial judge did
not discharge the jury following a sudden wave of publicity in the closing stages
of the case.199  The defendants had exercised their right to remain silent under
police questioning.  Shortly before the jury retired to consider its verdict, both
                                                          
189. For discussion of recent developments, see S.H. Bailey, The Contempt of Court Act 1981, 45
MOD. L. REV. 301 (1982); David Corker & Michael Levi, Pre-trial Publicity and Its Treatment in the
English Courts, 1996 CRIM. L. REV. 622.
190. See Bailey, supra note 189; Corker & Levi, supra note 189.
191. See supra text accompanying note 40.
192. See Neil Vidmar, The Canadian Criminal Jury: Searching for a Middle Ground, 62 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 151-55 (Spring 1999).
193. See Corker & Levi, supra note 189, at 628-29.
194. See id. at 629-30
195. See generally id.
196. See id. at 625 (quoting, for example, Chief Judge Taylor in Ex parte Telegraph Plc, [1993] 1
W.L.R. 980, 987).
197. See id. at 624.
198. See id.
199. See R. v. McCann, 92 Crim. App. 239 (Eng. C.A. 1991).
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the then-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Lord Denning (former
Master of the Rolls) made widely publicised comments that implied that indi-
viduals who did not answer police questions probably were guilty.200  The Court
of Appeal stated that “we are left with a definite impression that the impact
which the statements in the television interviews may well have had on the fair-
ness of the trial could not be overcome by any direction to the jury.”201
Another example of the court intervening due to pretrial publicity involved
the prosecution of detectives responsible for investigating the Birmingham
Six.202  The trial judge controversially ruled that the effect of pretrial publicity
damaging to the detectives was irreparable.203  In a case in 1995, following the
arrest of a soap opera star and her common law husband for having oral sex in
their car parked on the exit lane of a motorway, a stay of proceedings was or-
dered when a number of newspapers published details of the man’s previous
criminal convictions and incidents involving the police that would have been
inadmissible at trial.204  In ordering the stay, the trial judge stated, “I have ab-
solutely no doubt that the massive media publicity in this case was unfair, out-
rageous and oppressive.”205
In the Maxwell case, an application for a stay of proceedings was not
granted, but the judge took a number of other steps to deal with prejudicial
publicity.  In England, it is unusual to screen jurors for their contact with preju-
dicial pretrial publicity, but potential jurors for the Maxwell case were screened
for what they had read or heard about the case in the media.206  The judge also
ordered that a transcript of his warning to editors to refrain from future preju-
dicial publicity be widely distributed.207
In addition, Kevin Maxwell was permitted to use opinion poll evidence on
the depth of prejudice against him.  Unlike U.S. and Canadian courts, English
courts are generally resistant to expert testimony on the effects of publicity on
jury decisionmaking.  However, when Maxwell applied for a stay of proceed-
ings on the ground of prejudicial pretrial publicity, three Gallup opinion polls
were submitted to Justice Phillips as evidence.208  In rejecting the application for
a stay, Justice Phillips found the evidence from the opinion polls of little use,
and said that he hoped that “their use in this case will not be taken as a prece-
dent in the future.”209  Nonetheless, he permitted screening of jurors for expo-
                                                          
200. See Corker & Levi, supra note 189, at 626 n.22.
201. 92 Crim. App. at 253.
202. The Birmingham Six case was one of the notorious miscarriage of justice cases involving IRA
bombings in the 1970s.  Six men wrongly were convicted of bombing two Birmingham public houses in
1974.  The convictions were based on forensic and police evidence which was later discredited.  See
CHRIS MULLIN, ERROR OF JUDGMENT (1986).
203. See Corker & Levi, supra note 189, at 627.
204. See id.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 628-29.
207. See id. at 628.
208. See id. at 631.
209. Id. at 614 n.45.
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sure to pretrial publicity, despite the general preference in England for retain-
ing a randomly selected jury as far as possible.210
X
EVIDENCE AND INSTRUCTIONS HEARD BY THE JURY
As in other jurisdictions, many rules limit the evidence that English jurors
may hear and require judges to give jurors particular instructions for delibera-
tion.  The rules are often implicitly based on assumptions about the limits to
jury competence and the likelihood that juries will be unduly prejudiced by cer-
tain types of evidence.  It has become established, for example, that juries
should be warned that several impressive and truthful identification witnesses
can be in error,211 a jury instruction referred to as the “Turnbull” direction.  Ac-
cording to Lord Steyn, a “sea change” in judicial thinking has recently occurred
obligating the trial judge to give a direction regarding good character.212
On the other hand, the English jury is charged with deciding matters that, in
other jurisdictions, are considered matters for experts.  Under the basic rule set
out by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Turner,213 expert evidence is not admissible
if it is “within the competence and experience of a jury,”214 making the scope
for expert evidence from psychologists and psychiatrists much more limited
than in the United States.  For example, the reliability of witness testimony is
considered a matter of common sense, and expert evidence from psychologists
is not normally admitted on this question.215  The rule has been applied par-
ticularly restrictively to psychiatric evidence.  As Lord Justice Lawton noted in
Turner, “[j]urors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who
are not suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and
strains of life.”216  While rules have become established in relation to some
categories of expert evidence, it is for the individual judge to decide whether
expert evidence will be admitted and whether he or she will comment on it.217
In discussing the admissibility of scientific evidence in a range of jurisdictions,
Gatowski et al. characterise the approach of the English courts as based on a
test of “‘relevancy’ and ‘helpfulness.’”218  The judge determines whether the
                                                          
210. See id. at 628-29.
211. See R. v. Turnbull, 1977 Q.B. 224, 228 (Eng. C.A.).
212. See R. v. Aziz, Tosum & Yorganci, 3 W.L.R. 53, 60 (Eng. H.L. 1995).
213. 1975 Q.B. 834 (Eng. C.A.).
214. Id. at 834.
215. See Gisli Gudjonsson, Psychological Evidence in Court, 9 PSYCHOLOGIST 213 (1996).
216. 1975 Q.B. at 841.  For further discussion of expert evidence from psychology and psychiatry,
see R.D. Mackay & A.M. Colman, Equivocal Rulings on Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Evi-
dence: Turning a Muddle into a Nonsense, 1996 CRIM. L. REV. 88.
217. For further discussion, see D. Carson, Some Legal Issues Affecting Novel Forms of Expert Evi-
dence, 1992 EXPERT EVIDENCE 79, 82-83.
218. Sophia I. Gatowski et al., The Diffusion of Scientific Evidence: A Comparative Analysis of
Admissibility Standards in Australia, Canada, England, and the United States and Their Impact on So-
cial and Behavioural Sciences, 1996 EXPERT EVIDENCE 86, 89.
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probative value outweighs any prejudicial effects and whether the evidence is
outside the jurors’ common knowledge.219
One type of evidence that has caused particular concern in England in re-
cent years has been that of previous convictions, especially in cases of indecent
assaults on children.  Unless there are certain specified reasons to allow it, such
evidence is excluded.  There has been a growing sense that this approach may
favour defendants too much.  However, according to research conducted for
the Home Office, caution about allowing evidence of previous convictions to go
to a jury is well founded.220  In a simulation study, a recent conviction for a
similar offence had a marked effect on the perceived likelihood that the defen-
dant committed the offence currently charged.221  Evidence of a previous con-
viction for indecently assaulting a child was found to be especially prejudicial.222
These effects were found even though the only information provided about the
previous conviction was the offence charged, with no further details of the of-
fence or its circumstances.223  The study also showed the dangers of making as-
sumptions about jury bias.224  The findings indicated that revealing a previous
conviction for an offence dissimilar to the one currently charged may actually
be more favourable to the defendant than revealing that he is of good charac-
ter.225  The research also confirmed earlier findings that jury instructions to use
the information for decisions regarding propensity rather than credibility are
likely to be totally ineffective.226
The defendant’s right of silence is another area where rules favourable to
the defendant have come under attack.  The right clearly has considerable sym-
bolic significance, though its actual effects are unclear.  As the result of a major
change introduced in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, a jury
can now be told of a defendant’s refusal to answer questions in police custody.
Moreover, a jury can now be instructed that it may draw inferences from the
fact that a defendant chooses not to testify in his or her own defence.227  The
change was justified on the ground that professional or hardened criminals
                                                          
219. See id. at 86-92; see also D. Carson, Expert Evidence in the Courts, 1992 EXPERT EVIDENCE 3;
D. Carson, supra note 217.
220. See Law Reform Comm’n, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Previous Misconduct of a De-
fendant app. D: The Oxford Study (Consultation Paper No. 141, 1995).  A second study replicating the
jury experiment with a sample of magistrates is in press.  See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, The Effects of In-
forming Magistrates That the Defendant Has Previous Convictions (Lord Chancellor’s Department
Research Series 1998) (on file with author).  A final report from the Law Commission on the law re-
lating to evidence of previous misconduct is imminent at the time of writing.
221. See Law Reform Comm’n, supra note 220, at 329.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 326.
224. See id. at 329.
225. See id.
226. See R. Wissler & M. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
37 (1986).
227. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, §§ 34-35 (Eng.).  These sections deal with the
inferences a jury could reasonably draw from a defendant’s failure to answer questions when inter-
viewed and the failure to give evidence.  Recommendations as to the essential points to be included in
a judge’s direction were made by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Cowan, 1996 Q.B. 373 (Eng. C.A.).
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were taking advantage of the right of silence and escaping conviction, although
this claim was unsupported by available evidence.228  The effects of the changes
and new instructions on juries’ decisions are unknown.
Although the trial judge has considerable discretion, his or her directions to
the jury are likely to be based very closely, if not totally, on specimen directions
prepared by the Judicial Studies Board.229  Using the specimen directions mini-
mises the likelihood of an appeal.  The judge’s summing up will normally in-
clude directions as to the respective tasks of judge and jury, the burden and
standard of proof, the definition of the offence charged, and the facts that must
be proved.230  Directions may include, for example, directions on the legal defi-
nition of “intention,” “knowing or believing,” or other terms such as
“dishonesty” or “indecency.”  The jury may be instructed that some questions,
such as whether there was indecency, are to be answered on the basis of ordi-
nary common sense.231  Directions may also be given on evidential points, such
as a “Turnbull” warning232 on the use of evidence of identification, confessions,
or previous convictions.233
Researchers conducting the 1993 Crown Court Study had the unusual op-
portunity to ask jurors in a large number of criminal cases to complete ques-
tionnaires.  The jurors were asked whether they found it difficult to understand
and remember the evidence, including scientific evidence, and whether they
had any difficulty following the judge’s instructions about the law.234  Most ju-
rors thought they had no great problems.235  To every question on these mat-
ters, more than ninety percent answered “not at all” or “not very” difficult.236
As the researchers rightly stress, the fact that jurors report that they think they
understood evidence and instructions does not prove that they actually did un-
derstand them.237  People are not always very good at describing how well they
remember facts and how they make decisions.  As with the research on judges’
summing up, outlined below, which was conducted as part of the same study,
                                                          
228. See D. DIXON, LAW IN POLICING: LEGAL REGULATION AND POLICE PRACTICES 229-30
(1997).
229. The specimen directions are not officially recognised, but in practice their existence and use
has become increasingly openly acknowledged and indeed encouraged by senior judges.  See Roderick
Munday, The Bench Books: Can the Judiciary Keep a Secret?, 1996 CRIM. L. REV. 296, 296.
230. See BAILEY & GUNN, supra note 6, at 881-86.
231. See id. at 883.
232. See supra text accompanying note 211.
233. See, e.g., R. v. Aziz, Tosum & Yorganci, 3 W.L.R. 53, 60 (Eng. H.L. 1995) (regarding trial
judge’s direction on good character).
234. See ZANDER & HENDERSON, supra note 79, at 206, 216-17.  The study was one of a number of
special studies requested by and carried out for the Runciman Commission, and was published as a
supplement to the Runciman Commission’s main report.  The questioning was conducted within the
constraints of the Contempt of Court Act, 1981, § 8 (Eng.).
235. See ZANDER & HENDERSON, supra note 79, at 206, 216-17.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 205.
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the restrictions in the Contempt of Court Act of 1981 meant that jurors’ replies
could not be related to other factual information about the cases.238
Jurors may take notes and ask questions during the trial if they wish, al-
though they rarely do so.239  After retiring to deliberate, they may send out
questions, but they cannot be provided with any new evidence at this stage.240
In the Crown Court Study, thirty-two percent of jurors said that one or more of
the jurors in their case had wanted to ask the judge for further directions after
they had retired to consider their verdict, but twenty-seven percent of those
who wished to ask for further directions had not actually done so, and of them,
thirty percent had not realised that they could do so.241
XI
THE INFLUENCE OF THE JUDGE
Hints from the judge are very likely to be a powerful influence on jury ver-
dicts.  The last stage of the trial before the jury retires is a summing up from the
judge, which will include a summary of the evidence as well as directions to the
jury on matters of law.  The judge has considerable latitude to let the jury know
his or her own view of the evidence, and the summing up may last up to several
hours.  An extreme example of a biased summing up by the judge is that given
in the case of David Bentley in 1953:  In July 1998, Lord Chief Justice Bingham
overturned the murder conviction,242 following more than forty years of cam-
paigning by Bentley’s family.  Lord Bingham, heavily criticised the then-Lord
Chief Justice Goddard’s summing up at the original trial which, he said, gave
the jury little choice but to convict, and deprived Bentley of his birthright as a
British citizen, namely a fair trial.243
The judge’s scope to comment on evidence and witnesses during the sum-
ming up in England contrasts markedly with the United States.  The contrast
was very apparent in the 1997 case of the British au pair, Louise Woodward,
who was convicted in a Massachusetts court of murdering a child under her
care.244  In most U.S. courts, interpreting the evidence is a responsibility re-
                                                          
238. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, § 8 (Eng.).
239. The procedure for asking questions (or indeed for making any kind of request of the judge
such as asking for a break) is for the juror to write it down and catch the attention of an usher who will
pass the note to the judge.  There may, of course, be reasons why the question the juror wants to ask
cannot be put to a witness.
240. For discussion of problems this may cause for juries, see Brian Clapham, Introducing Psycho-
logical Evidence in the Courts, in PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS 101 (Sally Lloyd-Bostock ed.,
1981).
241. See ZANDER & HENDERSON, supra note 79, at 205.
242. See R. v. Bentley, T.L.R., July 31, 1998, at 492.
243. See Adrian Lee, The Verdict Comes 45 Years Too Late: Bentley Is Innocent, TIMES (London),
July 31, 1998, at 1.
244. The conviction was reduced by the judge to one for manslaughter.  The decision was appealed
by both the prosecution and defence; the result was affirmed.  See Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694
N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998), aff’g Commonwealth v. Woodward, No. Crim. 97-0433, 1997 WL 694119
(Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 1997).
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served for the jury, and it can seek no help in this task.245  In the Woodward
case, the judge did not summarise or comment on the evidence but only gave
the customary directions on the law.246  The contrast with the practice in Eng-
land gave rise to discussion in the British newspapers.
The 1993 Crown Court Study explored jurors’ views about the judge’s
summing up in a survey sampling more than 800 Crown Court cases.247  Nearly
one half of the jurors surveyed thought it would have made no difference to the
difficulty of this task if the judge had not summed up on the facts.248  However,
nineteen percent said it would have made their task “much harder.”249  Not sur-
prisingly, the longer the case, the more likely jurors were to say that the judge’s
summing up on the facts was useful.250  Remarkably few jurors, just over six
percent, reported finding the judge’s directions on the law difficult to under-
stand,251 although we do not know whether their perceptions were accurate.
The extent to which jurors are swayed by comments or hints from the judge
has proved difficult to study,252 but the Crown Court Study provides some in-
triguing findings on this point.  Jurors were asked whether they thought the
judge’s summing up pointed toward conviction or acquittal, and to what extent
they felt any “tilt” was justified by the evidence.253  The results were complex.
Thirty-three percent of jurors said the summing up was “tilted” toward either
conviction or acquittal—almost exactly equally often in each direction.254  The
“tilt” in the summing up was, as expected, very closely associated with the re-
sult of the case, but there were cases in which the jury did not follow their per-
ception of the judge’s tilt.255  Thus, nine percent of jurors who viewed the sum-
ming up as pro-conviction reported that the jury had in fact acquitted.256  Of
those viewing the summing up as “somewhat” for conviction, thirteen percent
reported that the jury acquitted,257 suggesting that juries are capable of resisting
the influence of the judge if they disagree with his or her view.  However, re-
sults also showed that sometimes juries acquitted or convicted against what
                                                          
245. It should be noted, however, that in U.S. federal courts and in some state courts, the judge has
the legal authority to comment on the evidence, but this power is rarely exercised and only then under
limited conditions.
246. See Frances Gibb, Trial Exposes Worst Traits of US Justice, TIMES (London), Oct. 31, 1997, at
4.
247. See ZANDER & HENDERSON, supra note 79, at 249.
248. See id. at 214.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id. at 216.
252. See, e.g., Zenon Bankowski, The Jury and Reality, in THE JURY UNDER ATTACK, supra note
41, at 8-26.
253. See ZANDER & HENDERSON, supra note 79, at 217-18.
254. See id. at 218.  Sixteen percent said that it pointed slightly or strongly to acquittal, and 16%
said that it pointed slightly or strongly to conviction.  Where they felt it had been tipped one way or
the other, 88% thought it was supported by the weight of the evidence.  See id.
255. See id. at 219.
256. See id.
257. See id.  Note that these results are for individual jurors reporting their views of the summing
up and their recall of the verdict.
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they themselves saw as the weight of the evidence because of the way the judge
had summed up.258  It is important to bear in mind that when it comes down to
these subgroups, the numbers of cases are quite small.  In addition, the research
was hampered by the provisions of the Contempt of Court Act of 1981, which
prevented jurors’ answers to questions from being directly related to other in-
formation the researchers had collected about the cases.  Relaxation of these
restrictions would allow much more informative research to be conducted.
XII
THE VERDICT
For centuries, juries’ verdicts in England had to be unanimous, and this
served as the model for the United States.  In England, however, the require-
ment of a unanimous verdict was dropped in 1967 by the Criminal Justice Act,
which permitted majority verdicts of ten to two.259  Juries are now initially in-
structed that they must seek a unanimous verdict, but that “a time may come”
when a majority verdict will be permissible, at which point they will receive fur-
ther directions.260  Juries must try for at least two hours to reach a unanimous
verdict,261 and judicial statistics for 1996 show that only twenty percent of con-
victions following a plea of not guilty in the Crown Court were majority ver-
dicts.262  When the jury delivers its verdict, the foreman will be asked in open
court whether the verdict is unanimous, and, if not, by what majority.263
Debate surrounding the change to majority verdicts raises familiar issues of
“crime control” versus the “due process” rights of the defendant.  The official
rationale for the change was to prevent professional criminals from escaping
conviction by intimidating or bribing individual jurors.264  It has also been ar-
gued that majority verdicts allow the views of extremists to be discounted in
jury decisions.265  However, critics believe that this change was motivated more
by a desire to save the expense of retrials and that it undermines the principle
that guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.266  As Sanders and Young
indicate, there is a double standard in the argument that a majority verdict can
neutralise extremists.267  As with jury vetting, the government accepts the de-
                                                          
258. Using a score of average juror responses, the researchers conclude that when the judge
“summed up for an acquittal ‘against the weight of the evidence,’” the judge directed “an acquittal in
four cases and the jury acquitted in the other nine.”  Id.  By the same averaging measure, they con-
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261. See id.
262. See LORD CHANCELLOR’S DEP’T, JUDICIAL STATISTICS, 1996 tbl. 6.11.
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fects of a random selection procedure when this serves prosecution interests
but not when it serves the interests of the defence.  Sanders and Young also ar-
gue that it is misleading to draw bare comparisons with the Scottish system,
where it is possible to convict on a simple majority of eight out of fifteen268 be-
cause, as Duff points out, Scotland has means of safeguarding the defendant
that have no parallel in England.269  For example, unlike in Scotland, in England
it is possible for a defendant to be convicted on the uncorroborated evidence of
a single witness or on uncorroborated confession evidence.270  The rules in
Scotland require the prosecution evidence to be corroborated.  Moreover, if a
Scottish jury cannot achieve a majority for conviction, the defendant is entitled
to be acquitted.271  In England, failure to achieve a sufficient majority either
way results in a “hung” jury, with the possibility of a retrial.272  Only a finding of
not guilty by at least ten out of twelve jurors entitles the defendant to be ac-
quitted.  Sanders and Young suggest that this symmetry between the require-
ments of a guilty and a not guilty verdict “is impossible to reconcile with the
presumption of innocence.”273
XIII
“QUESTIONABLE” VERDICTS AND JURY NULLIFICATION
Throughout the centuries of their existence, English juries have been
known to acquit in the face of both overwhelming evidence of guilt and a judi-
cial direction for conviction.  Although such acquittals may be unpopular with
those seeking a conviction, they have long been legally justified.  In 1784, Lord
Mansfield stated that in his judgment, the jury in the sedition trial of the Dean
of St. Asaph had the duty of “blending law and fact” in its verdict and in doing
so the jurors might follow “the prejudices of their affections or passions.”274
Even though the judge might direct the jury how to reach the right legal an-
swer, the jurors have it in their power to do wrong, “which is a matter entirely
between God and their own consciences.”275
Various categories of “jury nullification” can be distinguished.276  A jury’s
refusal to apply a law in a specific case can be seen as a show of support for in-
dividuals who have taken a stand against the government.  A prime example is
the jury’s refusal to apply Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act in the Ponting
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274. R. v. Shipley, 99 Eng. Rep. 774, 820 (1784).
275. Id. at 824.
276. See Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury (June 1998) (draft paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Aspen, Colorado).  As Marder also points
out, it is entirely possible that in some questionable acquittals a combination of these categories may
be operating.
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case discussed above.  In another well-known case, Pottle and Randle were ac-
quitted in 1991 of their part in the escape of traitor George Blake from Worm-
wood Scrubs prison in 1966 despite a published admission in their book subti-
tled How We Freed George Blake—And Why.277  More recently, in August
1996, four women were acquitted of damaging a British Aerospace Hawk jet in
protest against their sale to Third World regimes.278
In some cases, juries may be refusing to apply what they see as bad law.  For
instance, the legal definition of murder in England does not require an inten-
tion to kill.  In a case heard before Lord Goff, the jury appeared to reject this
definition of murder.279  The defendant had rammed a jagged glass into his vic-
tim’s face and severed the man’s jugular vein.  The defendant did not intend to
kill him, and indeed, was horrified at his victim’s death.  He did, however,
clearly intend to cause “really serious harm” which constituted sufficient mens
rea for murder.280  The jury, despite being directed to that effect, acquitted him
of murder.  According to Lord Goff, the jurors could not bring themselves to
call him a murderer, a position with which Lord Goff himself entirely sympa-
thised.  In other cases, juries may be protesting about something other than a
specific law, for instance racism, poverty, or police misconduct.
Instances of deliberate jury nullification would seem to be different in kind
from cases where the jury appears to have simply got it wrong.  However, it is
not always possible to distinguish clearly between verdicts where a jury is using
its power to decide in defiance of the law or government and verdicts where the
jury has been confused, incompetent, or prejudiced.  As commentators have
pointed out, the notion that a verdict can be “wrong” or “perverse” is premised
on a particular view of the nature of truth and jury trials,281 and it often means
little more than “a verdict I disagree with.”  Baldwin and McConville’s study of
the Birmingham Crown Court in the 1970s revealed a lack of consensus among
“experts” (that is, lawyers, judges, and police282) as to what was a questionable
verdict.283  Adopting a method similar to that used by Kalven and Zeisel,284 they
asked judges, lawyers, and police involved in jury trials for their opinions on ju-
ries’ verdicts, both acquittals and convictions.  A clear pattern emerged in ac-
                                                          
277. For a fuller discussion of the Pottle and Randle case, see Simon Jolly, Images and Ideologies of
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FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Aug. 6, 1996, at 22.
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quittals.  Those involved on the defence side tended to see acquittals as justi-
fied, and those involved on the prosecution side tended to see them as ques-
tionable.285  Acquittals were seen as fully justified eighty-three percent of the
time by defence solicitors, compared with sixty-five percent by prosecuting so-
licitors, and forty-eight percent by the police.286  The defence solicitor expressed
“serious doubts” about only ten percent of acquittals, while the prosecuting so-
licitor expressed “serious doubts” about twenty-six percent of acquittals and
the police forty-four percent.287
Not surprisingly, the pattern was reversed in cases of doubtful conviction.
Prosecuting solicitors doubted the convictions least often and defence solicitors
doubted them the most often.288  Surprisingly, the police expressed the most
doubt about both convictions and acquittals,289 suggesting an overall scepticism
of jury verdicts.  Although questionable verdicts may be either acquittals or
convictions, the consequences of doubtful convictions can clearly be much
more serious and may result in a deprivation of liberty.  Baldwin and McCon-
ville observed that little research had been done on the question of doubtful
jury convictions,290 and that remains true today.
XIV
CONCLUSION
The jury may be one of the most venerated institutions in the English legal
system, but it is proving vulnerable to attack.  Over the last century, the right to
trial by jury has been steadily eroded, from the virtual abolition of jury trials in
civil cases to the removal of the option of jury trial in a large number of crimi-
nal cases.  Increasingly serious criminal offences are being tried before benches
of lay magistrates, which is, as McBarnet puts it “a different brand of justice al-
together.”291  The trend looks set to continue.  The current Labour Government
is already looking at proposals to limit the role of juries in fraud trials and to
remove the defendant’s right to insist on jury trial in either way cases.
Jury trials are undeniably more costly and time consuming than trials in
magistrates’ courts, but many of the other criticisms made of juries and jury tri-
als are much more questionable.  Arguments both for and against the jury
quickly become entangled in ideology and metaphor, the politics of crime con-
trol and efficiency, and the rhetoric of justice and liberty.  Justifications put
forward for change often include claims that jury trial tends to favour the de-
fendant, but these claims are frequently based on no more than anecdote and
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have sometimes even run counter to the evidence available.  There was no reli-
able evidence, for example, that the right of silence was being abused by pro-
fessional criminals, nor that the peremptory challenge was leading to acquittals
by stacked juries.  And it is by no means clear that juries acquit in serious fraud
cases because they cannot understand complex evidence.
To seek sound justification for reform in terms of the jury’s rationality,
competence, or efficiency may be to miss the point.  Many commentators have
stressed the importance of understanding the jury in terms of politics and the
organisation of power.292  Brown and Leal write, for example, that several cen-
turies ago
jury trial became an element in the historical struggle between a judiciary claiming
pre-parliamentary, constitutional authority grounded in the Magna Carta and parlia-
ment exercising its prerogative to create summary jurisdiction by statute . . . .
To the present day . . . governments have not liked them.  They rightly thought
that juries could not be relied on to convict in certain sorts of cases . . . .293
It is ironic that the English jury, which has served as a model for other
countries, is in a state of continuing decline just as jury trial is being revived in a
number of countries.  Spain has recently reintroduced the right to trial by jury
in limited cases, and in a number of former communist regimes in Eastern
Europe, including Russia, the introduction of jury trials is seen as a move to-
ward the establishment of the rule of law.  It remains to be seen whether the
decline of the English jury is terminal.  In a subset of criminal trials at least, the
jury has so far proven robust, maintaining strong support amongst the general
public and many senior members of the legal profession who are well aware of
its failings and drawbacks.  The jury has great symbolic significance and is still
highly prized, not least because it continues to exercise its long-standing right
to reach a verdict based on conscience, against the letter of the law, and occa-
sionally in defiance of government.
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